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I. ADDRESS
The events of the past several months have once again raised
questions in the United States about secret intelligence operations,
and whether such activity is appropriate in a democracy such as ours.
What we have learned, and what I will discuss, are the circumstances
under which the use of secret intelligence cannot only be very appro-
priate and necessary, but a vital part of maintaining our national
security. What I have to say fits into a consideration of the role of the
branches of government with respect to foreign policy, because much
of what we do involves the gathering of information so that
policymakers can make wise foreign policy decisions. Not foreign
policy as decided by the CIA, but foreign policy as decided by the
policymaking branches of government.
Not long ago, someone gave me a lapel button that read: "My
job is so secret that even I don't know what I am doing." There may
be some correlation between that statement and how we feel about
secrecy. It conjures up images of Orwellian intrusion by government,
clandestine activities that put our most cherished individual liberties
at risk, and mistakes and blunders concealed within classified docu-
ments. There is, of course, a historical basis for these concerns,
including some incidents in very recent history. It is not my purpose
to rehash these incidents. Rather, I intend to discuss the collection of
intelligence at home and abroad, and how our Constitution, without a
single reference to intelligence, has accomodated this function so vital
to our national security, and has inspired a system of oversight.
Taking a leaf or two from my past experiences on the federal
bench and as the Director of the FBI, I conduct my responsibility
today in accordance with two cardinal theses: First, the intelligence
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activities so vital to the protection and preservation of our national
security must be conducted professionally, objectively, and with abso-
lute fidelity to our Constitution and laws. Second, there must exist a
trustworthy system of oversight and accountability that builds, rather
than erodes, trust between those in the executive branch who have the
intelligence responsibility and those in the legislative branch who act
as surrogates for the American people.
Intelligence has always played a major role in our history and is
at least as old as our Constitution. A couple of years ago, Malcolm
Forbes gave Bill Casey and me a copy of a letter that George Wash-
ington wrote to Major Tallmadge in 1779,1 in which he outlined some
of his thoughts on the need for, and the requirements of, good intelli-
gence work. I am also reminded that earlier, in 1777, George Wash-
ington wrote to Colonel Elias Dayton discussing the need for
intelligence. He wrote:
The necessity of... procuring good... [i]ntelligence.. . is appar-
ent and need not be further urged. All that remains for me to add
is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon
secrecy, success depends in most [e]nterprises of this kind and for
want of it, is generally defeated.2
In 1790, secret funding for foreign intelligence activity was formalized
by the Congress in the form of a secret contingency fund to be used by
the President.3
Today, our government depends heavily upon accurate intelli-
gence to formulate and conduct our foreign policy. We need intelli-
gence to verify compliance with the arms agreements we have made,
and to determine whether we could verify compliance with arms
agreements that may be signed in the future. We need intelligence to
understand both the military capabilities and the intentions of our
adversaries. And more recently, we need intelligence to deal with the
twin scourges of narcotics and terrorism. Today, the primary con-
sumers of intelligence information are the President, the Vice Presi-
dent, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Treasury, the National
Security Council, and of course, the select committees of the Senate
and the House of Representatives.
We have learned at great cost that intelligence must be timely in
order to be of any use. In July, I spent a day at the North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), inside of Cheyenne Moun-
1. Letter from George Washington to Major Benjamin Tallmadge (Sept. 24, 1779),
reprinted in 38 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 330 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1933).
2. Letter from George Washington to Colonel Elias Dayton (July 26, 1777), reprinted in
8 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 479 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1933).
3. Ch. 4, § 3, 1 Stat. 104, 105 (1790).
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tain, near Colorado Springs. NORAD is one of the principal early
warning systems for the air defense of the United States and Canada.
After spending a day there, one cannot help becoming aware of how
important early and accurate intelligence is for our national defense.
Just last week, I was at Strategic Air Command Headquarters (SAC),
in Omaha, Nebraska, where the same message came through loud and
clear. A visit to the Middle East, with views of the East and West
Banks, the Golan Heights, and all the armament assembled at the
borders of Israel, Jordan, and Syria, impressed upon me the impor-
tance of our gathering and understanding reliable, timely intelligence.
Of course, the same is true of the tactical situation in the Persian
Gulf. Much time has passed since our Constitution was drafted, and
now, in a nuclear age, we must think of preattack warning times in
terms of minutes, rather than months or years.
The forms of intelligence vary, from human intelligence, of
which we are all aware; to the gathering of public source information
around the world; to signals, communications, and imagery intelli-
gence, some of which involves satellites upon which a substantial part
of our budget is spent.
It is important that information that is collected be interpreted in
an objective way-that the Director of Central Intelligence and the
people who analyze the information can be seen as giving our best
estimates. We must not be seen as trying to shape or influence policy
because our reponsibility is to provide policymakers with the kind of
information that they need to make the best decisions and the best
judgments in the interest of our national security.
In addition to intelligence collection and analysis, the CIA plays
a role in implementing foreign policy. This is done through our cov-
ert action programs. Although covert action is not defined by law, the
term has come to be understood as referring to activities conducted in
support of national foreign policy objectives in such a way that the
role of the United States is not readily apparent. These include polit-
ical work through communications-getting the same message out.
They also include training and supplying important materials to those
who support America's interests throughout the world. Covert capa-
bility, essential in our foreign policy, provides needed support for lib-
eration movements, and allows us to work in collaboration with
governments who, for legitimate political reasons of their own, do not
wish to have the United States' role and involvement publically
known in their countries.
From President Franklin Roosevelt forward, every president in
my lifetime has endorsed and used covert action to support the for-
1988]
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eign policy of this country. Although covert action traditionally
claims only a small part of the CIA's budget, less than three percent,
it is the focus of the greatest congressional and public attention. Hav-
ing seen some of the responsibilities for covert action move outside the
CIA into the National Security Council, I can understand how this
has added to the confusion, the suspicion, and the ill ease of the
American people. I have heard this situation described as "a govern-
ment without rules inside a government that did not know." Now
that responsibility for covert action has come back to the CIA, I hope
never to leave again. I would like to convince you that we do have
rules that, if followed by men of integrity and dedication, will meet
both the constitutional requirements and also sustain our national
security needs.
We must, of course, have secrecy. Both Congress and the judici-
ary have recognized the need for secrecy in matters of national secur-
ity. The Freedom of Information Act,4 for instance, has express
provisions protecting matters of foreign counterintelligence informa-
tion supplied to us by foreign intelligence agencies.3 The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act 6-- the act under which all electronic sur-
veillance of counterintelligence takes place in this country-provides
for a special court to review in secret the applications filed to conduct
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes." This statute
has been found to be within the confines of the Constitution.8
The main purposes of secrecy in these efforts is to preserve and
protect "sources" and "methods," two of the most important words
in the intelligence world. If we cannot protect our sources, whether
they are FBI informants or CIA assets developed around the world,
we will not get the information we need. If we cannot protect the
sensitive methods by which we collect the information-both in terms
of individuals on the ground and satellites in the air-we will cease to
have the means of collecting the information.
Although secrecy is necessary in these circumstances, there are,
nevertheless, official surrogates looking after the interests of the
American people. In 1976 and 1977, both houses of Congress estab-
lished intelligence oversight committees to monitor all significant
4. Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 552, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982)).
5. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(D) (West Supp. 1988).
6. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982)).
7. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (1982).
8. United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1444
(2d Cir. 1983).
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intelligence activities and expenditures.' We find many of the rules
which govern our activities in the National Security Act,'0 and the
Hughes-Ryan amendment," and the Intelligence Oversight Act.' 2
The oversight committees operating under those acts have formalized
the reporting of intelligence and covert activities to Congress. The
intelligence community is now required by law to keep Congress and
the intelligence committees of the Congress fully and currently
informed of all intelligence activities. Under the Hughes-Ryan
amendment, the President must find that each covert action is impor-
tant to the national security before the operation can be initiated."'
These are the "findings" you have been reading about.
Under law it is our duty to notify the intelligence committees of
"any significant anticipated intelligence activity,"' 4 which includes
any activity requiring findings under the Hughes-Ryan amendment.
In extraordinary circumstances affecting a vital national interest, the
President can limit the notification to the chairmen and ranking
minority members of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and
minority leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority and
minority leaders of the Senate, referred to in trade parlance as the
"Gang of Eight."'5 Another statutory requirement is that the intelli-
gence committees be fully informed in a "timely fashion" of intelli-
gence activities in foreign countries, other than those solely for the
purpose of collecting intelligence, for which prior notice was not
given.' 6 In addition, the President is required to state the reasons for
not giving prior notice in those circumstances.' 7 These tightly framed
procedures ensure getting the information to the surrogates of the
American people in a proper and timely way.
We are improving the management capability to deal with covert
activity on the executive side. It is not enough for the President to
make a finding authorizing and directing us to take some covert activ-
ity. Before submitting the proposal to the President, we in the intelli-
gence community have a responsibility to determine that it can be
accomplished within the law. We must be sure that the individuals
who are out on the firing line, in many instances outside the reach and
9. Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-419, 90 Stat. 1279,
1299 (1977).
10. Ch. 343, § 102, 61 Stat. 495 (1947) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1982)).
11. Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 662, 88 Stat. 1804 (1974) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982)).
12. Pub. L. 96-450, § 407(b)(1), 94 Stat. 1981 (1980) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1982)).
13. 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982).
14. 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (1982).
15. 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1)(B) (1982).
16. 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) (1982).
17. Id.
19881
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
protection of our Constitution and our laws, can do their work in
accordance with the flexibility that they need, and with the clearest
possible training and understanding of their responsibility to the CIA
and to the country.
Our own internal covert action review group within the CIA now
looks carefully at all aspects of proposed covert activity, and asks
itself these kinds of questions: Is it consistent with overt United
States foreign policy? Failure to ask this question is what went wrong
in the Iran-Contra situation. Will it work? Not all covert activities
will work, and we have to assess that possibility. What are the conse-
quences going to be if the work is publicly exposed? Will it make
sense to the American people? Is it consistent with American values?
Not all covert activities are going to succeed. But if the proposed
covert activities are subjected to these kinds of tests and this kind of
management, we have the best chance of getting the most effective
and productive use from our covert capability. Furthermore, all of
these questions should be addressed again when the proposal goes to
the National Security Council, often with the President in attendance,
for its consideration and recommendation.
Our relationship with Congress must be based on truth, not
deception. There is so much confusion about deniability and decep-
tion that it is important to make one legitimate distinction. Often in
covert activity, there is deception to conceal the source of the activity.
This deception permits us to implement our foreign policy through
means that we believe to be appropriate, but which by necessity must
be covert. In dealing with the Congress, however, there is absolutely
no excuse for deception. There will be occasions when I may not be
in a position to respond to a particular question, especially in an open
session of the Congress. But it is possible to tell the Members of Con-
gress, and I have done so on occasion, that I am just not at liberty to
answer the question. This is very different from trying to answer the
question narrowly or cutely, or pretending that they have failed to ask
the question precisely enough, when I know what the Congress wants
to hear from me. We have an obligation to speak to each other as
individuals doing business, knowing what the other wants to know
and being honest about what we are going to tell or not tell one
another. If I decline to answer for reasons that seem legitimate to me,
there are always opportunities to elevate the issue. Congress can
appeal my decision to a higher authority, or it can make it sufficiently
rough on me that I might conclude I have to answer. But a level of
honesty, a recognition that nothing is being withheld by deception, is
vitally important in the sharing of power. There is also a correspond-
[Vol. 43:155
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ing obligation on the Congress and its committees, whose members
serve as surrogates for the American people, to take into account the
needs of secrecy and to share that responsibility with the same care
and concern for the protection of our sources and methods that are
imposed upon the executive branch.
The challenges we face in intelligence require a high degree of
cooperation, not only within government but outside it as well. One
key element of our society that has always been important to us is the
American academic community. As some of you may know, academ-
ics were in the beginning of our modern intelligence system. Profes-
sors and scholars flocked to Washington to become the backbone of
the Office of Strategic Services in World War II. Many of them
stayed on after the War and were instrumental in creating the CIA in
1947. They became key research directors, operations officers, manag-
ers, and leaders. Moreover, their legacy is still with us.
Today we rely very much on colleges and universities, not only
to supply the new people who make our system work, but also for the
expertise they can provide us in so many areas. Many faculty mem-
bers work closely with us. Some even become scholars in residence,
sharing their knowledge with us on a day-to-day basis. There are at
least forty-three colleges and universities at which a course in intelli-
gence will be taught this year, and there are many others where a
discussion of intelligence will take place in a course on foreign poli-
cymaking. Agency officers participate in professional and scholarly
associations and make substantive presentations on college campuses
throughout the country. There is nothing secret about these relation-
ships, nor should there be. We believe that there can and should be a
close working relationship between the academic community and the
intelligence community in developing accurate assessments about the
world around us.
We recognize that the campus is also a legitimate place for dis-
cussion and dissent. Over the past few years, students and faculty
opposed to the administration's policies have chosen the CIA and its
recruiters as the targets for many of their protests. On one occasion,
they even came to our CIA campus in Virginia. Despite this activity,
we continue to seek out the best and the brightest from our Nation's
campuses to join us, and they continue to come. A week or so ago, I
was at Dartmouth, speaking on a campus noted for its capacity for
dissent. I was pleased to see both the interest and the support that
exists among students when issues are rationally, clearly, and accu-
rately presented to them.
In conclusion, shared responsibility for intelligence is vitally
1988]
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important on both the executive and the congressional sides. We in
the intelligence community must work closely with those in the exec-
utive branch who must make the policy recommendations. We must
provide objective, professional assessments that help put truth into
action. We must work with the congressional committees that act in
secret matters as surrogates for the Congress and the American peo-
ple. Most importantly, we must be worthy of their trust. We must
diligently carry out our assignments around the world, however diffi-
cult, with fidelity to the Constitution and the laws of our beloved
country. No nation dedicated to the rule of law can protect itself in
any other way.
II. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
SPEAKER: Periodically, books are published that purport to
contain classified information about our intelligence gathering capa-
bility. How damaging are these books, and what can we do to try to
prevent this kind of damage in the future?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Books that reveal classified information
can cause a great deal of damage to us. They can help our adversaries
identify the sources and the methods by which intelligence was, and
is, collected. Even if the sources and methods have become matters of
common knowledge in a particular country or area, they can still be
used effectively elsewhere. There is always the potential of defeating
legitimate purposes in disclosure of this information.
I have never believed in hiding wrongdoing through secrecy or
confidentiality. In fact, Congress will always be able to get from me
anything it needs when it believes there is a question as to whether we
are engaged in something we should not be doing. But it is very
important to protect our sources and methods. Those who were given
information in trust and who have betrayed it have, in fact, betrayed
their country.
SPEAKER: You said that your agency, the CIA, is deeply
involved in the determination of the ability to verify compliance with
treaties. You may want to comment on what you think about the
likelihood of adequate verification of compliance with the proposed
treaties.
JUDGE WEBSTER: Verification will be the responsibility of
the whole intelligence community: The CIA, the National Security
Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and all of the
other military components of the intelligence community. The main
concern that we confront is making the decisionmakers aware of both
the strengths and weaknesses of our verification potential. We have
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been giving information to the policymakers and to the NSC, and pol-
icy is being made with knowledge of our strengths and weaknesses.
Frankly, two issues concern me at the present time. First, how
are we going to deal with 100 Secretaries of State if and when a treaty
is submitted to the Senate? I am afraid that everyone may want to be
personally briefed on all of the strengths and weaknesses in our verifi-
cation ability. We will have to find a way to give at least quantitative
information to the members of Congress so that they can make a con-
fident, informed judgment when called upon to vote on these issues.
Second, how are we going to protect our actual weaknesses from
the public and foreign hostile intelligence elements? There are very
significant risks associated with arms control agreements. These risks
are made worse if our weaknesses are exposed publicly, or exposed in
any way that makes them perceptible to the other side. These risks,
however, must be measured against the benefits and the promise of a
more peaceful world.
SPEAKER: What, if any, legislative changes would you recom-
mend to Congress that would make the CIA's difficult job more man-
ageable without sacrificing our values of decency?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I appreciate the question, but I don't
think I can answer it without giving improper recognition to the pres-
ent climate. Our society's concept of decency is an evolving one.
Similarly, our concept of what is permissible and impermissible is also
an evolving one. These values are deeply affected by war and the
threat of war. At the present time, I cannot think of any legislative
changes that would relieve us of a major burden. I believe that the
current regulations, rules, and procedures are workable, provided that
we staff ourselves with men and women of integrity who respect the
law. The competition between the branches of government must not
place the intelligence community in a squeeze between claims of right
to know and threats to go public on sensitive issues or secret matters.
Revelations of sensitive sources and methods could put both lives and
programs at risk.
It is my principal theory that if we can develop a greater level of
trust between those of us responsible for collecting the information
and implementing foreign policy through covert action and those
responsible for overseeing covert activity, then we can protect the
Nation's security under the present legislation. It comes down to peo-
ple and an attitude that they can work together. I hope it is clear that
for the process to succeed, it is essential that the major heads of gov-
ernment and the President approve all CIA covert activity, and that
Congress be fully informed about that activity.
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